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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building Inspector for Salt Lake City, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 8275

HARRY L. YOUNG, KENNETH L.
ANDERSON and WILLIAM W ALKENHORST,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COME NOW the defendants and respondents in the above
entitled case and petition the court for a rehearing upon the
following grounds:
I. In determining that the structures in question are within
the terms of the ordinance, the appellate court has invaded
the province of the trial court as a finder of fact.
II. In holding that the prohibiting of the structures in
question is reasonably related to the public health, safety,
3
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morals and general welfare, the court has relied on a line of
cases which has no applicability to the facts in this case.
A Brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.

PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
721 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT ONE
IN DETERMINING THAT THE STRUCTURES IN
.QUESTION ARE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE ORDINANCE, THE APPELLATE COURT HAS INVADED THE
PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT AS A FINDER OF
FACT.

POINT TWO
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROHIBITING OF THE
STRUCTURES IN QUESTION IS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS AND
GENERAL WELFARE, THE COURT HAS RELIED ON A
LINE OF CASES WHICH HAS NO APPLICABILITY TO
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE.
4
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POINT ONE
IN DETERMINING THAT THE STRUCTURES IN
QUESTION ARE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE ORDINANCE, THE APPELLATE COURT HAS INVADED THE
PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT AS A FINDER OF
FACT.
Because of the brevity of the op1n1on rendered by the
Court in this case, it is difficult to determine the grounds upon
which the Court held that the structures in question were
within the terms of the Salt Lake City ordinances here being
considered. We are unable to tell whether the Court is holding
by this opinion that any device, structure or growth is prohibited in a sideyard regardless of whether or not it may be
part of a building or whether the court is holding, contrary
to the holding of the trial court, that the carports or rigid
awnings in question actually do constitute a part of the building. It is submitted that this point should be clarified. Left
in the position in which the opinion heretofore rendered leaves
it, doubt is thrown upon the right of a landowner to have
anything in his sideyards. The language of the court could
be constructed to prohibit trees, clothes-line poles, beach umbrellas, shrubbery or anything else that extends above the
surface of the ground. Such was certainly not the intention
of the City Commission in adopting the ordinance in question.
The clear intendment discernable from the language of the
ordinance is otherwise. The Section of the Ordinance quoted
by the Court is as follows:
'' (a) The area of a side or rear yard shall be open
and unobstructed, except for the ordinary projections
5
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of window sills, belt courses, cornices and other ornamental features to the extent of not more than 4 inches
except that where the building is not more than 2 inches
in height the cornice or eaves may project not more
than 2 feet into such yard ... " Sec. 6727, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944.
It will be noted that all of the exceptions contained in the
above quoted section apply to things which are definitely and
unmistakably integral parts of the building. No exception is
made as to such matters as trellises, fences, detachable awnings,
trees or shrubbery, which are commonly found in every side
yard for the reason that the clear intendment of the ordinance
is to apply only to buildings and, therefore, no exception is
needed as to things which are not parts of buildings.
The basic statute to which the exceptions above quoted
apply reads as follows:
((In all Residential A, A-3, B-2, districts, for every
building erected there shall be a side yard along each
lot line. The least dimension of any such side yard
shall be 35% of the building height, but in no case less
than 8 feet for Residential A and A-3 ... " Sec. 6725,
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944.
The only interpretation that can be placed upon this section
is to the effect that the side yard requirements shall apply to
buildings and not to other devices which may ordinarily be
found in a yard. It does not seem conceivable, therefore, that
the court could have intended to extend the application of
the ordinance regarding side yards to things which are not
parts of the buildings.
Assuming, therefore, that the court intended to extend the
statute only to buildings, we are still left with an uncertainty

6
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as to whether or not the court construed the rigid awnings or
car ports in question as being independent buildings themselves, or whether they are constructed as being integral parts
of the residences. It seems quite clear from the city ordinances
that they cannot be considered as independent buildings in
themselves.
Section 401 of the Building Code defines a building as
follows:
"A building is any structure built for the support,
shelter and enclosure of persons, animals, chattels or
movable property of any kind.''
As was pointed out in our brief in this case, there is no enclosure involved here. Therefore, the structures cannot be considered as independent buildings in and of themselves, and
it does not appear logical that this court would have so considered them. We are then left with the supposition that this
court must have considered the structures as an integral part
of the resiqential building.
It is respectfully submitted that if the appellate court did
thies, it invaded the province of the trial court as a finder of
fact. The legal principles to which we must have reference
to determine whether or not an improvement becomes part of
the realty or part of the building are too well established to
require reiteration here. Suffice it to say that the trial court
found under the evidence by applying such legal principles
that these devices were not parts of the buildings. They are
not permanently attached to the building; they are bolted to
the building and are readily and easily removable without
damage to the building. On the open side they are supported
7
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by posts, which are also readily removable. Based upon this
evidence, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that the
devices in question were not parts of the buildings but were
merely adjuncts thereto, just as would . be a television aerial
or any other readily removable improvement. The principle
that an appellate court should not disturb a finding of fact by
the lower court which is supported by creditable evidence is
well established. In this regard see Clark v. Dulien Steel
Products, Inc. et al, (Cal) 128 Pac. (2d) 608; Koury v. Vogel,
et al, (Okla) 130 Pac. (2d) 93; Fitzkee v. Turner (Cal) 75
Pac. (2d) 522 and Stow et al v. Bruce et al (Okla) 61 Pac
2d) 104;,.
The question of whether a finding that a structure attached to but removable from the realty actually becomes a
part of the realty is a question of law or fact was considered
by the District Court of appeal in California in the case of
Oakley v. Butler, 59 Pac. (2d) 826. Certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court of California. In the Oakley case certain
improvements were made to a building by an assignee under
a contract of sale. The original vendee defaulted and the
vendor brought foreclosure action. The assignees in possession
maintained that certain i~provements which they had installed
were not part of the realty and so not subject to foreclosure.
The trial court held with the assignees to the effect that the
improvements were not part of the realty. This ruling was
attacked on appeal. In refusing to pass upon this matter on
appeal, the appellate court stated:
"The question as to whether or not property affixed
to real estate becomes a part of the real estate is ordi8
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narily a question of fact to be determined by the trial
court from all of the evidence in the case. tA thing is
deemed to be affixed to land when it is * * * embedded
in it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting
upon it, as in the case of buildings; or permanently
attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of
cement, plaster, nails, bolt, or screws.' Civ. Code, Sec.
660. tWhen a person affixes his property to the land
of another, without an agreement permitting him to
remove it, the thing affixed, except as provided in
section ten hundred and nineteen, belongs to the owner
of the land, unless he chooses to require the former
to remove it.' Civ. Code, Sec. 1013. In Andrews v. First
Realty Corporation, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 407, 44 P (2d)
628, it is said: tThe question whether the property involved in this case became a fixture or remained personal property is a question of fact to be determined
by the fact finder upon all the facts and circumstances
in evidence bearing upon the question. It is the duty
of this court on appeal to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the respondent; and if we find any
substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the trial
court it is our duty not to disturb such findings."
Certainly in this case there is creditable evidence from which
the district court could have found that the devices in question
were not part of the building and from which he did so find.
As has been pointed out above, the structures are not permanently attached, but are readily removable. They are no
different in principal from a large umbrella erected in a side
yard which would extend across and afford shade and protection from rain to the driveway. The trial court having so
found, its decision in this matter should not be disturbed by
the appellate court.
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POINT TWO
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROHIBITING OF THE
STRUCTURES IN QUESTION IS REASONABLY RELATED TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS AND
GENERAL WELFARE, THE COURT HAS RELIED ON A
LINE OF CASES WHICH HAS NO APPLICABILITY TO
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE.
As a basis for its holding that the prohibiting of the devices
here concerned is reasonably related to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare, this Court relies upon the case of
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 71 L. Ed. 605, 47 S. Ct. 675.
We have no quarrel with Goreib v. Fox, except that it has no
applicability to the facts of the case now before the court.
Goreib v. Fox did not give cities carte blanc power to enact
zoning ordinances as evidenced by the fact that 1nany zoning
ordinances have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court since Gorieb v. Fox. In that case the city ordinance complained of required buildings in the designated residential
area to have a designated set-back. The building which was
there proposed was a commercial building set flush with the
street having a two story brick wall erected right on the front
property line. The Supreme court sustained the ordinance
pointing out a number of reasons why the proposed structure
might be detrimental to the public health, safety or general
welfare. None of these reasons have any applicability to the
instant case however. The Supreme court goes into the question
there of ·light and air, plus vision of drivers at intersections,
etc. As we have previously pointed out, we have no question
here of interference with light, air or vision;we have no question
10
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of congestion of population; we have no questoin of fire
hazard. The only question involved is one of aesthetic values.
In a later case, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S.
183, 72 Law Ed. 842, the Supreme Court of the United States
struck down a zoning ordinance as having no relation to public
morals, safety or public welfare when such an ordinance acted
to prohibit a commercial building in an area which was commercial in character. These devices are consistent with the use
of the area for residential purposes. They have no detrimental
effect on the public welfare, health or safety. They are not
opposed by the persons most direct! y concerned-those living
next door, as evidenced by the letters from these individuals
contained in the city files and introduced in evidence in the
court below.
There is no line of cases depending upon Gorieb v. Fox
or any other fundamental decision upholding the right of the
city to prohibit devices such as there in residential areas. The
only two cases which we have been able to discover decided
by the Courts in the country definitely hold that these devices
do not violate set back or side yard requirements. These cases
are: Olcott v. Sheppard Knapp Co., 89 N. Y. Supp. 201 and
French v. Cooper, 43 Atl. (2d) 880. The case of French v.
Cooper is directly in point with the case here being considered.
We wish again to quote from the language of the Court 1n
that case:
"The sketch returned with the record discloses that
the building proper has the necessary setbacks on both
Atlantic Ave. and North Street and in the absence of
proof to the contrary, we hold that the awning is not
11
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a part of the building. There is no evidence that it is
permanent! y attached to the building and it is at most
an adjunct thereto, i. e. added but not essentially a
part thereof.
nit is settled that a municipality has no po\ver to
limit the use to which property may be put unless the
regulation is designed to promote public health, safety
and general welfare. Durkin Lbr. Co. v. Fitzsimmons,
106 NJL 183, 147 Atl. 555. We fail to see in what
respect the erection of this awning can adversely affect
public health, safety or general welfare. The absence
of a brief on behalf of the respondents suggests that
they too experience the same quandry. The fact that
nearby property owners have expressed themselves as
favoring the proposed awning and they have no objection waives against the reasonableness of the decision
to refuse the permit. Prosecutor is entitled to his permit
and costs."

CONCLUSION
Brevity is certainly a virtue to be applauded in judicial
decisions or in any other writing, provided the ground is
covered adequately~ However, a decision of an appellate court
has a function other than to merely determine the disposition
of the case immediately before the court. If such were the only
purpose all cases could be disposed_ of either by the words,
"reversed and remanded" or "affirmed." The decision in this
case does little to advise the city officials or the residents of
the city what they can or cannot do in regard to the erection
of structures in their sideyards. The basis of the decision is
left to conjecture. It will leave the law in such a state of uncer-

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tainty as to place persons desiring to improve their property
in a position of peril and will lead to further litigation.
It is submitted that a rehearing should be granted in
this case and the principles set forth in the brief in support
of this petition should be examined by and disposed of by this
court.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
721 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents
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